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Alternatives for the "Leftovers"
There are, at a minimum, four million persons age 16 and 
over whose employment and earnings problems are so 
serious that they cause economic hardship. The structural 
problems of these low earners, totally and intermittently 
unemployed, involuntarily part-time and discouraged 
workers, are only modestly alleviated by economic growth 
and tight labor markets. Millions of individuals lacking 
education, skills, experience, equal opportunity or good for 
tune will be "leftovers" under any reasonable economic pro 
jections for the foreseeable future.
There are several options for dealing with these 
"leftovers." They can be ignored and left to make do with 
what is available in the labor market and income 
maintenance programs. Alternatively, the "safety net" of 
transfer programs can be improved to reduce the hardship 
resulting from their employment problems. Financial incen 
tives and appeals to corporate conscience may be used to en 
courage employers to reach further down the labor queue. 
Job placement and economic development strategies might 
try to better match these workers with available jobs. Sub 
sidized jobs may be created for them. Finally, training may 
be provided in order to improve their ability to compete in 
the labor market.
Job Creation and Training Levels
Since the Great Society, and particularly under the Carter 
administration, active efforts to address the causes and
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alleviate the symptoms of these structural problems increas 
ed exponentially. Employment and training activities have 
been a major growth area of social welfare policy. In con 
stant 1980 dollars, total expenditures rose from next to 
nothing at the beginning of the 1960s to the billion dollar 
level in fiscal 1965; they doubled again within the next year; 
redoubled by 1972; and then tripled between 1972 and 1978, 
before dropping precipitously at the close of the decade. 
Training expenditures rose, in constant dollars, from near 
zero at the start of the 1960s to $650 million in 1968 and to 
$1.9 billion in 1980.
The relative emphasis on training and employment ap 
proaches has fluctuated, but training has declined as a pro 
portion of combined expenditures, representing the 
predominant activity until the War on Poverty, declining to 
63 percent in 1969 and to only 15 percent of expenditures in 
1978. Despite the rapid growth of real training expenditures 
and the multi-billion dollar pricetag, remedial efforts for the 
"leftovers" in the labor market represent only a small share 
of our nation's total education and training activities and 
reach only a small portion of the universe of need. Public ex 
penditures for higher education and vocational education in 
1980 were twenty-five times those targeted to persons at the 
end of the labor queue. In 1980, new participants in targeted 
training represented only 1 percent of the labor force. The 
average monthly enrollment in training programs 
represented less than 5 percent of average unemployment.
Training Approaches
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act is the 
legislative umbrella for most of the employment and training 
programs for the disadvantaged. Under a complex array of 
separate categorical authorizations, it provides funds by for 
mula to states and localities for activities they design and 
manage within the framework provided by federal law,
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regulations and oversight. It also funds national programs 
for special needs groups, as well as the Job Corps, a 
nationally-operated residential training program for severely 
disadvantaged youths. GET A provides four categories of 
training: (1) Job Corps is a structured program of vocational 
instruction, basic education, work experience, counseling, 
health care, and living experiences in a residential center; 
(2) local classroom training is a full-time activity, which in 
cludes occupational instruction as well as basic education 
and other remediation in an institutional setting; (3) on-the- 
job training is a full-time activity, where a participant is 
hired by an employer and trained primarily at the worksite, 
with public funds covering the extra costs of supervision and 
training; and (4) supplemental training is a part-time or 
short-term activity enhancing subsidized work experience or 
a limited intensity service to help in the transition into the 
labor force.
Job Corps is the most comprehensive and intensive pro 
gram and focuses on the most disadvantaged among those in 
need—young school dropouts from poor families. It cost 
over $13,000 a training year in fiscal 1980. Local classroom 
training, which is nonresidential and deals with a somewhat 
more employable group, had a cost of $8,000 per year. On- 
the-job training serves the most employable of those in need 
and had a cost of $6,000. Supplemental training for par 
ticipants in subsidized public service employment (PSE) cost 
$2,700 per training year. Transition services—largely for in- 
school youth—averaged $800 per service year.
The Nature of Training
CETA training is typically short-term, aimed to prepare 
the participant for entry level occupations or to provide basic 
educational credentials or English competency. Job Corps is 
most ambitious, with an average duration of stay for com- 
pleters of 1.2 years. However, there is a high early dropout
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rate with 40 percent of participants leaving before 90 days 
and another 30 percent leaving before full completion, so 
that the average duration of stay is 6.0 months. Local 
classroom training averages 5.5 months for completers, but 
because of early dropouts, the average duration of stay is 
around 5.1 months. On-the-job training averages 4.3 
months.
Job Corps vocational training is concentrated in the con 
struction trades, automotive and machine repair, health and 
food services, and clerical occupations. Local classroom 
training is predominantly in the clerical, craft, and service 
fields. Local on-the-job training is mainly in the clerical, 
operative and nonconstruction craft occupations.
All Job Corps participants receive basic education or GED 
preparation along with vocational training and a comprehen 
sive array of manpower and supportive services. A fifth of 
local classroom trainees are exclusively in education ac 
tivities and another fifth are in a combination of vocational 
and educational activities. There is very little preparatory 
work for OJT, since the training mostly occurs at the 
worksite. Half of classroom trainees and a smaller portion of 
OJT participants receive a much more limited level of such 
services.
Who is Trained?
Job creation receives priority over training under CETA. 
Classroom training was available for less than a fifth of new 
enrollees in local programs in fiscal 1980, or three in ten ex 
cluding the summer program, while OJT was available for 
less than one in twenty, or 8 percent excluding the summer 
program. Enrollments in Job Corps accounted for only 5 









PSE training 250 
Transition services 116
Job Creation
Summer youth employment 705 
In-school and out-of-school
youth employment 330 
PSE 870 
Adult work experience 400
The chances of assignment to a training component rather 
than a work component vary significantly among different 
groups in the CETA eligible population. Local classroom 
training is most often used for persons of the most limited 
employability. Females, Hispanics and "other" minorities, 
dropouts, single parents and persons with inadequate 
English-speaking ability, have above average chances of 
assignment to classroom training, while younger and older 
participants, whites, males and high school graduates are 
more likely to receive other assignments. In marked contrast, 
on-the-job training slots are more likely to go to the most 
employable among the CETA population—whites, males, 
graduates, and parents in two-parent families. Job Corps is 
restricted to poor youth age 16 to 21 who are from deprived 
backgrounds so that they need residential treatment. To 
some extent, Job Corps is the "program of last resort" for 
youth who have dropped out of school (85 percent of 
enrollees), been rejected by the military (one of every four) 
or had trouble with the law (two of every five). Those new 
enrollees in Job Corps in 1980 who had less than a high 
school diploma represented one-third the enrollments of 
poor dropout youth in all CETA local programs.
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Earnings Impacts
Studies of the categorical programs which preceded CETA 
generally found that classroom training increased the post- 
program earnings of participants, typically between $250 
and $300 in the year after termination. Studies of OJT usual 
ly estimated a high payoff, typically ranging between a $400 
and $900 increase in annual earnings. Past assessments of 
Job Corps reached very mixed conclusions, while studies of 
adult basic education documented increased earnings.
New evidence is available concerning the post-program 
earnings relative to control groups for 1977 Job Corps par 
ticipants and fiscal 1976 local CETA participants. 
Classroom trainees earned $350 more in the year after leav 
ing than a comparison group, an increase of 10 percent in an 
nual earnings. On-the-job trainees gained $850, an 18 per 
cent increase. These post-program earnings gains were in 
contrast to the patterns for fiscal 1976 work experience par 
ticipants who, at best, broke even relative to like nonpar- 
ticipants.
Social Security Reported Earnings Levels
Relative to Comparable Nonparticipants
(Fiscal 1976 Entrants Terminating in Calendar 1976)
Change 
1977 to 1978 
1977 1978 (adjusting for inflation)
Classroom Trainees $347 $442 + 18%
On-the-Job Trainees 839 574 -36
Public Service Employment 
Participants 261 326 +16
Work Experience Participants -149 -187 -17
Participants in Combina 
tions of Activities 356 164 -57
The procedures for selecting the comparison groups and 
for measuring post-program earnings using Social Security 
records were as rigorous as possible and generally conser-
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vative so as not to exaggerate impacts, yet there are many 
technical issues inherent in the ex post facto matching of par 
ticipants with nonparticipants, and in the use of Social 
Security data to estimate earnings. Nevertheless, the results 
are confirmed by follow-up interviews of the participants in 
different components. Comparing second-year post- 
program earnings for second-half fiscal 1975 CETA en 
trants, and adjusting for differences in measurable 
demographic characteristics and pre-program experiences, 
classroom trainees gained $588, and OJT participants gained 
$965 relative to adult work experience participants, or 
roughly the same relative magnitudes as estimated for 1978 
by matching 1976 participants with controls. It appears, 
then, that earnings impacts are substantial for both 
classroom training and OJT, and that they increase over time 
for classroom training while declining for OJT.
Estimates of Job Corps impacts are more rigorous because 
the comparison group could be more carefully selected. Job 
Corps increased the civilian earnings of 1977 participants by 
$209 above those of the comparison group in the first post- 
program year and $487 in the second year. This represented 
an 8 percent earnings increment in the first year and a 13 per 
cent increment in the second. Job Corps also increased 
military enlistment substantially, so that the total earnings 
impacts were even greater.
Who Benefits From Training?
Based on the evidence for 1976 local CETA participants, it 
appears that all race, sex and age groups benefit significantly 
from on-the-job training when compared to like nonpar 
ticipants. Female participants, persons with low or no earn 
ings before entry, and middle-aged participants did par 
ticularly well in classroom training. The measured gains 
from classroom training increased substantially between the 
first and second post-program years, particularly for
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females. All groups gained more from OJT than work ex 
perience, and all except minority females gained more from 
classroom training than work experience (although this judg 
ment about the relative payoffs of work vs. training is hedg 
ed somewhat by technical issues about the measurement of 
earnings of work experience participants getting jobs in the 
public sector).
Female Job Corps participants gain more than males in 
terms of earnings, although males gain slightly more in terms 
of hours of employment. Females without children do 
somewhat better than females with children.
The Anatomy of Gains
Increased employment rather than increased earnings rates 
account for most (though certainly not all) of the real earn 
ings gains. For fiscal 1975 classroom trainees, over four- 
fifths of the increase in real annual earnings from the year 
prior to entry to the first year after termination resulted from 
a rise in the percent time employed. Comparing the pre-entry 
to the second post-termination year, increased employment 
accounted for three-fourths of the real gain. Approximately 
half of classroom trainees with employment before and after 
participation had lower real hourly wages in the second post- 
termination year than in the year before entry. For fiscal 
1975 OJT participants, increased employment accounted for 
all of the real earnings gain in the first year and four-fifths of 
the gain between the pre-entry and second post-termination 
year. Among on-the-job trainees, however, two-thirds with 
previous earnings kept ahead of inflation in their hourly 
wages. Fiscal 1977 Job Corps participants earned 11 percent 
more than controls in the first two post-program years but 
worked 16 percent more hours; in other words, all their gains 
















































































of many individuals moving up in wages, some moving 
down, with a greater likelihood that more marginal par 
ticipants will find employment but at low wages. It appears 
that employment gains are more pronounced immediately 
but then lead to higher earnings rates gains as individuals 
prove themselves or use their skills in their new jobs.
The -increase in employment, in turn, appears to result 
more from increased labor force participation than from 
reduced unemployment. Among local classroom trainees in 
second half fiscal 1975, the increase in the percentage of time 
in the labor force from the pre-entry to first post-program 
year equaled two-thirds of the increase in percentage time 
employed for all trainees, while the increase from the pre- 
entry to second post-termination year accounted for half the 
employment time increase. Three-fifths of the net increase in 
time employed from the pre-entry to second post-program 
year for classroom trainees was accounted for by individuals 
who had zero earnings in the pre-entry year. For OJT par 
ticipants, two-thirds of the employment gains in the first 
year were also explained by increased participation, and zero 
earners before entry accounted for 45 percent of the net in 
crease in percent time employed from pre-entry to the second 
post-termination year. For 1977 Job Corps participants, in 
creased labor force participation over the two post-program 
years also accounted for two-thirds of the increase in 
employment.
Success Factors
The impact of institutional training is determined by the 
duration of stay and placement. All of the post-program 
earnings gains for 1976 classroom trainees were accounted 
for by the group entering employment on terminating the 
program. While it is not surprising that those immediately 
employed had higher near-term earnings relative to controls 
or relative to other participants not placed, it is significant
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that the differentials remained substantial two years later, 
even after refined adjustment for most of the observable dif 
ferences between those placed and not placed.
The earnings impacts of training increase more than pro 
portionately with its length. The estimated annual earnings 
gains of 1976 classroom trainees staying one to 20 weeks 
were only one-sixth those of participants staying 40 or more 
weeks.
1978 Earnings Gains 
of 1976 Classroom Trainees
Stayed 1-10 weeks $ 83
Stayed 11-20 weeks 224
Stayed 21-40 weeks 832
Stayed over 40 weeks 1377
Placed 1209
Not placed 8
Job Corps males who stayed less than 90 days, and those 
who did not continue to completion were earning the same as 
controls during the period 12 to 18 months after termination; 
in contrast, those completing a vocational program earned 
$1,250 more on an annualized basis. Early female dropouts 
gained $300 on an annualized basis, partial completers $750, 
and full completers $1,500.
Trainees who stay longer are also more likely to be placed. 
Several factors are involved which cannot be clearly 
separated. Sorting occurs in that those who stay longer have 
measurable characteristics that are predictive of post- 
program success. The sorting is greater in Job Corps, where 
only three of ten participants are full completers, compared 
to local classroom training where three in four complete the 
usually shorter duration assignments. Yet for both Job 
Corps and local classroom training, the effects of duration 
of stay and placement remain significant after adjustment 
for the differences between dropouts and completers.
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Moreover, the dropouts and short-stayers earn much the 
same as their controls over the long-run, so that sorting of 
the "winners'* and "losers" is not an explanation of the 
substantial gains of completers. Completion itself appears to 
be a substantial factor. Those completing local classroom 
training have a high probability of being placed whatever 
their duration of stay. Those who complete Job Corps train 
ing gain substantially more and are more likely to be placed 
than participants who stay as long but do not complete. 
Corps members who secure a GED earn more than matched 
individuals who do not. Finally, the effect of duration of 
stay is strong even when placement is used as an additional 
control variable in regression analyses of earnings gains. All 
this supports the conclusion that training increases human 
resource endowments and employability, and that those 
trained longer are more likely to obtain certification which in 
turn improves the chances of finding employment or being 
placed.
Training Occupations and 
Occupational Mobility
Training tends to move individuals from the secondary 
labor market and irregular jobs into low level but more 
regular jobs. Among 1976 classroom trainees with previous 
experience, a fifth had worked primarily as garage atten 
dants, transportation operatives, laborers, farm workers or 
private household workers. Only a tenth of trainees with 
work after termination held such jobs. The share working as 
craftsmen and welders increased from 11 to 17 percent, while 
clericals rose from 20 to 27 percent.
Among on-the-job trainees, over a third were placed in the 
same broad occupational categories in which they had 
previously worked, while over a fifth were assigned to train 
ing positions in a lower occupational level. Comparing the 
occupational distribution before and after training, the pro-
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portion working as laborers, transportation operatives, 
garage workers, farm laborers and private household 
workers actually rose from 13 percent to 15 percent.
A third of Job Corps entrants have had no regular work 
experience and the remainder have largely worked in menial 
"youth" jobs. Job Corps training helps them secure entry 
level "adult" jobs although only one in seven participants 
ends up as a completer with a training-related job. The bulk 
of "placements" are in manual, entry clerical and entry 
health jobs secured by the participants mainly through their 
own initiative.
Little is known about the "best bets" for training. Most 
females in local classroom training are in clerical and service 
occupations (usually health). While 17 percent of all 1976 
classroom trainees with a job before entry worked in female 
clerical occupations, 35 percent of trainees were in female 
clerical occupations and 25 percent of those with a job after 
training remained in these occupations. Three-fifths of par 
ticipants trained in clerical work who subsequently got jobs 
ended up in training-related work, as did two-thirds of those 
trained in service jobs. The rates of training-related employ 
ment were much lower for trainees in other occupations. For 
instance, nonconstruction crafts are a frequent training 
cluster for males, but the batting average of this training ap 
pears low in terms of subsequent training-related employ 
ment. While OJT participants are more likely to find 
employment in the occupation of assignment, those "train 
ed" as service workers, laborers, garage workers, farm 
workers and transportation operatives are less likely than 
other OJT participants to stay in the same occupation, prob 
ably because they are able to find something better on their 
own.
In Job Corps, the best bets for completion, placement, 
and higher wages for males are manual occupa-
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tions—forestry, gardening, construction and industrial pro 
duction; for females, forestry, gardening, construction and 
health are the best bets. Over the longer run (12-18 months 
post-termination), however, persons trained in these occupa 
tions are less likely to register gains relative to controls than 
those trained in some other occupations including transpor 
tation and service for males and the clerical field for females. 
In other words, the training that looks good in the short-run 
does not look as good in the long-run. Also, some occupa 
tions such as construction increase wages but not employ 
ment, while health occupations increase employment but not 
wages.
Educational Competencies and 
Employability Skills
In addition to occupational training, the other ingredients 
in local classroom training and in Job Corps include 
remedial instruction, basic life skills training and attitudinal 
or motivational improvement activities. Even less is known 
about the effectiveness of these efforts than about occupa 
tional training. While the measurement tools for assessing 
maturity, socialization and job readiness are crude, it ap 
pears that changes do occur, at least in programs for youth 
(who may be most malleable to such interventions).
The "intangibles" are a major factor behind the Job 
Corps' success. Tests of social and attitudinal changes, 
health care, and job-related knowledge and behavior suggest 
that participants in Job Corps for over 90 days experience 
significant gains along all the social-attitudinal dimensions. 
These measured changes are reflected in a dramatic drop in 
arrest rates over the first year out of Job Corps (10.9 per 
hundred compared to 16.7 for controls according to the 
follow-up of 1977 participants), delays in marriage and 
childbearing, reduced out-of-wedlock births, increased 
mobility, and increased matriculation in college and post-
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secondary training. However, Job Corps achieves these 
changes by creating a 24-hour a day structured environment 
away from other influences. The supported work program 
that provided well-organized and well-run full-time employ 
ment opportunities for youth, but did not remove them from 
home environments and did not include counseling, recrea 
tion, motivation, student government and the like, did not 
produce positive changes in criminal behavior or drug abuse, 
nor did it significantly increase post-program employment 
constancy.
School-based programs aiming to improve "employability 
skills" through instruction and activities designed to expose 
youth to work settings and requirements are able to change 
tested vocational attitudes, job knowledge, job holding 
skills, work relevant attitudes, job seeking skills, and sex 
stereotyping in career goals (although not, apparently, 
changing self-esteem). However, these attitudinal and skill 
gains do not alter post-program labor market or educational 
behavior except when combined with substantial job 
development activities so that employers recognize that the 
changes have occurred, and unless the activities are targeted 
to youth who plan to immediately enter the full-time labor 
market after graduation rather than continuing their educa 
tion. Moreover, gains are not realized in summer programs 
which have about half the treatment hours, suggesting that 
intensity and continuity are necessary to change attitudes 
and skills. On the other hand, short-term interventions that 
provide a helping hand at the point of job search can 
substantially increase the immediate chances of employment 
with little or no effect on measured employability.
Education gains are easier to measure. There is clear 
evidence that a variety of alternative methods can increase 
the functional academic competencies of even the most 
educationally disadvantaged, with learning rates far ex 
ceeding school norms for such individuals. Participants in
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Job Corps, who have an average tested reading level of 5.6 
years at entry, gain 1.5 years in 90 hours of instruction and 
2.2 years in 150 hours. The key is a self-paced, individualized 
approach with the flexibility to be delivered a few hours daily 
in combination with other activities. Few of the disadvantag- 
ed and dropout participants are seeking or wishing to accept 
full-time academic instruction. Computers simplify delivery 
of these self-paced, individualized materials, increasing the 
gain rates, helping to standardize curricula, reducing paper 
work, and facilitating delivery in a variety of settings.
Finally, CETA eligibles can benefit from more advanced 
education but will not participate unless extended a helping 
hand. In May 1981, 2,000 of the 42,000 Job Corps members 
were enrolled in post-secondary institutions with the help of 
Job Corps. The retention rate of those enrolled the previous 
year was 70 percent. These youth would not be in college 
without this assistance. Less than half a percent of a com 
parison group for 1977 Job Corps participants were in col 
lege in 1979. In a structured experiment to test a GI-Bill 
voucher approach as an alternate treatment strategy for 
CETA-eligible youth, only half of the control group attend 
ed college the next year, compared to nine-tenths of those 
provided tuition and expenses, as well as counseling and 
other assistance. Among the experimentals, four-fifths of 
those who attended college were still enrolled through three 
semesters compared with only half of the controls who 
originally matriculated. Those experimentals who were in the 
cohorts receiving educational and personal counseling had 
better retention than those simply provided financial sup 
port.
Work as Training
One justification for work experience is the claim that a 
period of subsidized, sheltered employment might serve as 
preparation for later unsubsidized employment, resulting in
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increased post-program earnings. The evidence suggests that 
this is only true for certain target groups and only if the work 
experience is structured in certain ways. The post-program 
earnings of 1976 adult work experience participants were ap 
parently no higher than those of matched nonparticipants, 
while participants in public service employment experienced 
a gain between $250 and $750 in 1977. The differential be 
tween PSE and work experience outcomes is explained by the 
relative likelihood of post-program employment in the 
public sector. All of the increase in employment from pre- 
entry to the first year post-termination for 1976 PSE par 
ticipants was due to increases in unsubsidized work in the 
public sector.
The supported work experiment carefully tested the im 
pacts of well-operated work experience projects structured to 
provide increasing responsibility, close supervision and peer 
support. It found little or no post-program earnings effects 
for dropout youth, drug addicts or ex-offenders, but a 
statistically significant impact for long-term AFDC recip 
ients, which resulted entirely from increased post-program 
employment in the public sector.
The Ventures in Community Improvement experiment 
used worksites as a classroom for training in construction 
trades, with journeymen instructors, linkages to unions, and 
structured skill progressions. Even though there was also 
substantial output from VICI projects, the aim was to teach 
as much as to produce, and those participants who did not 
accept the "real-life" performance requirements were more 
likely to be terminated than in most youth work programs. 
The resulting placement rates in construction, in unions, and 
in high wage jobs far exceeded those for comparable work 
projects that did not emphasize training, even though there 
were very modest differences in positive termination and 
placement rates.
110
Where participants receive work and training combina 
tions, they appear to benefit more than from work ex 
perience alone but less than from classroom training or OJT. 
In fiscal 1976, only 6 percent of participants in nonsummer 
local CETA activities (excluding direct referral) received se 
quences of primary activities such as work and then 
classroom training or work and then OJT. The net gains for 
multiple-activity participants equaled the weighted average 
of the impacts estimated for the separate components, sug 
gesting that when work and training are combined, the post- 
program earnings effects will be largely determined by the 
amount of training provided.
Summer employment for disadvantaged teenagers modest 
ly increases the likelihood of returning to school and the pro 
bability of part-time employment in school. The employ 
ment effects are concentrated among the 14 and 15 year-old 
participants, particularly minorities and females, i.e., those 
least likely to secure employment in the absence of the pro 
gram. On the other hand, there are no measurable gains in 
job knowledge, vocational attitudes, jobseeking or job 
holding skills, relative to control groups. Apparently, a first 
work experience provides a "taste for earnings" or helps to 
overcome fears about work without markedly altering at 
titudes or employability skills.
In summary, work experience can be useful for young peo 
ple in advancing workforce entry. It can be combined with 
training activities in a sequence, with benefits roughly pro 
portional to the degree of training. A worksite may be struc 
tured as a training site and can yield some of the benefits of 
classroom and on-the-job training while producing useful 
output, but this model is the exception rather than the rule in 
local work experience programs. In most other cir 
cumstances, the subsidized work will only have post- 
program impacts if it serves as a try out or on-the-job train 
ing mechanism for an existing unsubsidized job in the public
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or nonprofit sector. This does not mean that work ex 
perience and public service employment are bad investments. 
If $1.00 in output is produced for every $1.00 in cost, then 
any post-program earnings increases or in-program benefits 
(such as reductions in crime) represent a positive return on 
the outlay. However, if the aim is to alter future employment 
prospects, work is only effective when properly targeted, 
designed or linked to unsubsidized employment.
The Return on the Investment
The public investment in training for persons of limited 
employability is profitable, as best this can be judged by 
benefit-cost analysis. According to the most reasonable (and 
purposefully conservative) assumptions about the fade-out 
of earnings gains measured in the two post-program years, 
about the dollar value of nonearnings impacts, and about the 
appropriate discount rate, Job Corps provides social benefits 
with a current value of $1.39 for every $1.00 invested. Utiliz 
ing the same assumptions and the estimated post-program 
earnings gains for 1976 local classroom trainees, CETA 
training returns $1.14 in benefits for every $1.00 invested. 
The estimates for OJT are less precise (because of a more 
complicated estimation methodology); but the range is from 
a low of $1.26 to a high of $5.93 in benefits for every dollar 
invested, with a "best" estimate of $2.18. Thus, on-the-job 
training pays off most, Job Corps ranks next, and local 
classroom training follows. Obviously, the three interven 
tions serve different client groups and produce different pat 
terns of benefits. Job Corps has noticeable earnings impacts 
but the "socialization" effects are equally significant. In 
deed, the reduction in crime is so substantial during par 
ticipation and in the year after, while the costs of crime and 
its treatment are so great, that the present value of the crime 
cost savings is about equal to the present value of the earn 
ings gains per participant from local classroom training.
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Even though the increase in post-program earnings per 
dollar of investment is greater for classroom training than 
for Job Corps, the total payoff is less because there are 
minimal effects on crime or dependency.
The "public" includes participants as well as the taxpayers 
who pay for the program. Social benefit-cost calculations ex 
clude transfer payments from costs and count as benefits all 
increased earnings. From the taxpayer perspective, transfers 
are included among costs and the benefits are not the post- 
program earnings gains, but rather the taxes they generate as 
well as the resulting reductions in dependency. Taxpayer 
benefit-cost ratios are, therefore, lower than social benefit- 
cost ratios, and though the latter are a more appropriate con 
sideration from a social policy perspective, the former will 
more likely concern the voters in a period when taxes are a 
major concern. Job Corps has the highest taxpayer benefit- 
cost ratio because the crime reductions are a savings to tax 
payers; there is a return to the taxpayer of $.91 for every 
$1.00 invested according to the most reasonable, albeit con 
servative, assumptions. The intermediate estimate for OJT is 
a return of $.72 for every $1.00 invested. Local classroom 
training returns $.60 for every dollar. Such recondite 
analysis hardly figures in the political equation, but it cer 
tainly justifies the solid political support for Job Corps and 
the preference for more OJT in the local activity mix.
Benefit-cost analyses of pre-CETA institutional and on- 
the-job training programs generally found that benefits ex 
ceeded costs. Estimates for Job Corps varied considerably, 
with several suggesting benefits less than costs (in part 
because they excluded the substantial crime and dependency 
reduction benefits and in part because they looked only at 
the short-term earnings which are depressed during the tran 
sition period immediately after termination). Using stan 
dardized assumptions which focus only on earnings effects, 
the benefit-cost ratios calculated from current impact studies
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of Job Corps and CETA classroom training are in the high 
range relative to past estimates, while the ratios calculated 
from recent OJT impact experience are in the mid-range 
relative to past estimates.
An Interpretation of the Evidence
The Role of Training
If all persons available and looking for work were ranked 
into categories based on prior experience, education, 
previous training and other measurable characteristics used 
by most employers in setting job requirements and in rank 
ing applicants, CETA enrollees would be concentrated at the 
low end of the distribution. The same standards used to 
establish eligibility for CETA, and the same problems which 
lead applicants to choose this option, are among those used 
by employers to rate individuals as high risks. Nevertheless, 
there is very significant diversity in employability among 
CETA participants. At one extreme, CETA may serve a 
single mother with a college degree reentering the labor force 
or a machinist displaced from a job in a one-industry town; 
at the other extreme, the participant may be a mentally 
retarded young person who has never held a job, or a school 
dropout who has spent the last five years in prison. Each set 
of characteristics can be assigned "batting averages" which 
are statistically valid predictors of outcomes in most settings. 
The mother and the machinist are good bets for training and 
for subsequent placement. The dropout or the handicapped 
youth are poor bets. Yet there is also much unexplained 
variance reflecting chance but also the wide range in poten 
tial among individuals sharing any set of characteristics. 
Some dropouts may be both motivated and intelligent, hav 
ing left school because of family responsibilities. Others may 
have dropped out because school was too slow and
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regimented, although they have now matured. Some may 
have very serious behavioral problems which are not record 
ed. Most failed in school because they simply were not as 
good in academic areas as those who passed. Five years in 
the future, these subgroups among the dropout population 
are likely to have quite different average success rates int he 
labor market. But it is impossible or at least difficult to iden 
tify the differences in potential which will produce these dif 
ferences in outcome. The differences emerge only when the 
individuals are "tested" by some common experience.
Employers must make hiring decisions based on 
characteristics they can measure and on the "batting 
averages" for persons with these characteristics. Available 
jobs at any point can be ranked into categories according to 
their hiring requirements, i.e., how much prior experience, 
education, previous training and other desirable 
characteristics the employers require. The distribution on the 
supply side of the labor market ranking the available 
workforce in terms of employability, is paralleled on the de 
mand side by the distribution of available jobs according to 
the minimum employability they will accept in applicants. 
Some jobs are always available for even the most unskilled, 
but generally there are more available workers in the low 
employability categories than there are jobs willing to 
employ such workers. Hence, the most disadvantaged in 
dividual could usually get a job if he or she really tried, but 
the rewards are meager relative to the effort, and all such in 
dividuals could not find employment if they looked at the 
same time.
Among jobs with equal hiring requirements, there is wide 
diversity in career potential. Some entry jobs are dead-ends 
while others can be first steps on career ladders. For the 
available worker entering the hiring door or reading the want 
ads, it is in many cases impossible to distinguish between 
jobs with career potential and those which lead nowhere.
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The labor market functions by iterative matching of 
workers and jobs. An individual with low potential hired in 
to a job may soon be fired or quit, or will be satisfied with 
menial work. One with high potential will either retain the 
job or look for another that provides more career opportuni 
ty. Eventually, he or she will find a career ladder and will 
move up, stay with a job long enough to be considered more 
employable, or acquire a credential in college or appren 
ticeship which documents to employers a set of skills or 
characteristics they desire. This individual will, then, move 
up the queue at the next point of availability for employ 
ment. Whether bouncing from job to job or remaining in 
dead-end employment, he or she will become identifiable as 
a "loser," moving down the queue in the eyes of employers 
at the next point of availability for employment.
Classroom training can impact on employment chances in 
several distinct ways: First, the training can serve as an ex 
periential sorting mechanism, not improving skills or creden 
tials, but rather identifying those participants with more 
potential and motivation. Employers will want to hire them 
instead of others with the same external characteristics 
because they know them to be better risks. Second, the train 
ing activity may serve as a way of gaining access to jobs 
without necessarily improving skills or credentials. This may 
occur through the institutional leverage of the delivery agent 
or by helping participants to find employment. Third, the 
training may be able to sort both individuals and jobs, 
matching persons who have been identified as having greater 
potential with entry jobs identified as more promising. 
Fourth, the training may improve potential by increasing 
motivation, employability skills or academic competencies, 
without providing credentials that employers will accept in 
the labor market. Fifth, the training may provide a 
demonstrable skill or a certification which is accepted in the 
labor market. The distinction between these effects is of
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more than academic interest. For instance, the second im 
pact process may produce measured gains in earnings 
relative to nonparticipants, but will do so largely by reducing 
the chances of the nonparticipants. The process will have no 
impact on skill shortages and the participants will benefit on 
ly to the extent their job search is shortened. The fourth pro 
cess increases performance in a job once secured, but does 
not increase either the chances of employment or the quality 
of the first job. Only the fifth process fills skills shortages 
and improves employability as assessed by employers who 
have no link to the training activities and are not leveraged 
by the delivery agent.
The Impacts ofCETA
The evidence suggests that local classroom institutional 
training for those at the end of the labor queue functions in 
all these ways. In general, however, the training is not of 
long enough duration to increase competencies to the point 
where they can be certified and documented. Only a small 
proportion of participants get a GED, sheepskin, or cer 
tificate indicating the completion of apprenticeship. There 
are very few occupations where skills can be taught in short 
order than can be certified or tested at the hiring door, and 
where a large number of jobs are available. Clerical training 
is one of these occupations, and it tends to work best where 
those who are trained are mature and have adequate 
academic competencies. Judging from the concentration of 
earnings gains among 30-44 year-old classroom trainees, 
women, and those previously out of the labor force—i.e., 
the groups most likely to be assigned to clerical train 
ing—there is little doubt that this occupation accounts for a 
substantial portion of the total gains from training. In some 
other occupations such as welding, basic skills can be taught 
quickly but lead to jobs for only a minority of trainees. For 
most occupations, long-term training is needed to gain useful
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skills or certification that is recognized in the labor market. 
Only the few classroom trainees who stay long-term acquire 
these skills and certifications, so that they need the place 
ment leverage of prime sponsors in order to realize gains.
Likewise, just a small proportion of Job Corps par 
ticipants complete advanced training or get a certification of 
competency (for instance, 5 percent complete a GED). Place 
ment assistance is concentrated on this minority, with little 
help provided to noncompleters. The overall gains produced 
by the program are largely the result of improved 
"potential" manifested in greater stability of labor force at 
tachment and employment, i.e., changes in motivation and 
socialization are rare, achieved in less intensive and less 
targeted local classroom training. The jobs which are secured 
by Corps members, most often by their own initiative, do 
not pay more and are not much different than those which 
could be secured without participation.
The sorting that occurs in local classroom training appears 
to be modest as judged by measured characteristics, but cer 
tainly the most employable within those entering training are 
likely to complete. Those who are placed among those who 
stay longer or complete are even more employable. It is im 
possible to determine how much the sorting identifies the 
persons with greater potential within any set of measured 
characteristics. It is likely that this occurs, but probably 
more through the placement process than the enforcement of 
completion standards. Those placed are the "best" both 
because they include individuals with initiative to get a job 
and those who are helped by the delivery agent. The fact that 
the impact of placement continues over time suggests that 
these individuals placed are indeed "better" after controlling 
for measurable differences and/or that jobs accessed for 
them are "better" in terms of stability and career potential. 
The gains registered by those placed who do not have long- 
duration training and have not, therefore, received certifying
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credentials, are probably a combination of these two factors. 
The converse of this observation is that sorting does not oc 
cur that will be accepted by the labor market in the absence 
of CETA leverage. The distinction between completers and 
noncompleters is not very specific in local classroom train 
ing, and only a minority of participants even know if they 
complete. An employer is not likely to give much credit to 
participation alone without knowing the standards for com 
pletion and whether these standards are enforced.
Job Corps sorting is much more significant because com 
pletion standards are competency based, the educational and 
vocational achievements are documented and the residential 
experience itself tends to separate the mature from the im 
mature. Those employers regularly hiring from Job Corps 
know the difference. Some use the achievement records. But 
the completion standards and the competency measures are 
not recognized by most local employers unfamiliar with the 
program, so that if a youth does not get a job through the 
program, he or she is unlikely to get credit and must prove 
himself or herself once hired.
The primary impact on local classroom trainees, par 
ticularly on those staying less than 90 days, is to help them 
get a job either by providing job search assistance, a staging 
ground, or actual job access or leverage. The modest gains 
for short stayers could be explained by just a few finding 
jobs more quickly than they would without participation. It 
is important to stress that the short stayers in local classroom 
training include a disproportionate number of dropouts, so 
those scheduled for short training are averaged in with the 
dropouts. The evidence suggests that short-duration job- 
search assistance and "hand-holding" for both in-school 
and out-of-school youth can increase short-run employment 
chances. It is likely, then, that such activities combined with 
traditional labor market exchange functions may work to 
modestly increase post-program employment chances
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without really improving the types of jobs secured, the par 
ticipants' skills, or their long-term prospects.
On-the-job training involves these same processes, but 
their relative importance is different. Sorting is much more 
predominant. The CETA decisionmaker can and does screen 
more candidates than a typical employer interviewing for a 
job, since all CETA applicants are assessed and usually the 
most employable are assigned to OJT. Because OJT is rarely 
a "piggyback" on other treatments, the sorting must occur 
basically on measurable employability characteristics rather 
than potential as demonstrated in prior participation. Judg 
ing from the wage change patterns, the occupational 
distributions and mobility patterns, it does not appear that 
there are wide gaps between experience and job requirements 
in the OJT match-ups of workers and jobs, or that extensive 
training is necessary, but the gaps may still be greater than 
usually exist for entry employees. Rather, the try-out period, 
then, offers an opportunity to determine whether the 
somewhat higher risk trainees, particularly those who have 
been outside the labor force and those who have lost their 
last employment and therefore may be of uncertain quality, 
will adjust to the job and normal entry instruction. This may 
mean the chance at more stable and better paying jobs for 
those whose careers have been disrupted, or an opportunity 
for entrants and reentrants into the workforce—albeit those 
with more education credentials—to get a chance to prove 
themselves. From this perspective, OJT is more of a screen 
ing device than a training ground. The one of three par 
ticipants who are not hired permanently are those who fail in 
the try-out or find that the assignment does not meet their 
expectations. Yet, the decline in the earnings gains from the 
first to the second year after termination, in contrast to the 
increase for classroom trainees, suggests that some of the 
OJT participants lose their jobs and the "training" is not 
transferrable, while the control group of equally employable
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individuals is able to eventually secure its own jobs with 
time. The provision of an immediate job is particularly im 
portant to reentrants or entrants who are more likely to re 
main in the labor force when they immediately get work than 
when they must search for their own employment.
Implications of the Interpretation
The interpretative framework, and its component con 
cepts such as sorting, credentialing, job access, and try-outs, 
as well as documented vs. potential employability, are im 
portant because of their broader policy implications. First, 
these concepts suggest why OJT is so hard to market to 
employers. Participants are referred and the employer must 
choose among them on the basis of documented employabili 
ty dimensions, i.e., they are risky to the extent that on 
average they have characteristics which would usually rank 
them below normal entry employees and their potential is 
uncertain because they do not follow the normal entry 
routes, for instance, being recommended by other 
employees. With the hire, the employer assumes the risk that 
the individual cannot "pick up the job" in the way normal 
hires do, and the subsidy must cover this risk. To the degree 
the job requires substantial training as opposed to mere 
orientation, the employer assumes an even greater risk. To 
overcome the employers' reservations, the delivery agent is 
inclined to screen participants as much as possible so that 
they meet the usual employability requirements of the job. 
Unless the best of the referrals is within the "risk range" 
covered by the OJT subsidy, the employer will not even par 
ticipate. But given the difficulties of finding OJT slots and 
the clear evidence that they help participants, the delivery 
agent may not want to jeopardize future placements and may 
provide referrals well within the risk range—providing wind 
falls to the employer—in order to assure future cooperation 
and to get immediate results for their participants.
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If the public accepted the initial risk by payrolling the par 
ticipant during a limited try-out period, the employer would 
have to be subsidized only for extra training costs rather than 
the hiring risk. The extra training costs for the individual 
could be better determined because there would be some ex 
perience. It would be possible to take greater risks. It would 
also be easier to piggyback on experiential sorting in work or 
classroom training programs, since the delivery agent would 
not have to convince the employer that prior sorting had oc 
curred, but rather could let him see for himself during the 
try-out. This approach would also permit a better identifica 
tion of what was actually occurring on the worksite in terms 
of training and relative to the capacities of each trainee.
Second, the placement effect differs but is important 
under all these processes. If classroom training does not lead 
to credentials or measurable skills, like typing speed, that 
can be tested by employers prior to hiring, its effectiveness 
rests on placement leverage as well as the training 
institution's reputation, which in the short-run may be af 
fected by publicity and linkage efforts, but over the long-run 
depends on the performance of the trainees that are placed. 
If there is no sorting of completers and noncompleters based 
on demonstrated acquisition of specific skills, then over the 
long-run the placement leverage and reputation will erode 
and individual participants who perform most effectively in 
training will not be able to translate their hard work and 
ability into commensurately better jobs.
Improving potential but not documented employability 
will help when and if the participant gets a job, but pays off 
more certainly when there is placement, particularly when 
this accesses jobs with career potential where the individual's 
abilities and newly acquired skills can be fully utilized.
Placement should become less necessary to the degree that 
training can provide accepted credentials or measurable
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skills; however, these are likely to be discounted unless the 
individual shares the characteristics and experiences usually 
associated with these credentials and skills, or has other im 
pediments to employment. This will be particularly true 
where an individual makes a "quantum leap"—for instance, 
the dropouts who entered Job Corps and were trained as 
customer engineers. It may be necessary even if there has 
been substantial sorting, training and certification, to pro 
vide for a try-out or to exert a special effort to secure place 
ment so that the skills and credentials are accepted at face 
value.
Third, credentials require longer training than is usually 
provided, and more sorting as well. In order to avoid hurting 
those who lack the potential for a major advance, the ob 
vious solution is to use a base-level training activity to pro 
vide worthwhile aid to large numbers while identifying par 
ticipants with the greatest potential for long training in a se 
cond tier of activities. Placement in the first tier, for the ma 
jority not moving on to the second, would continue to find 
"better" jobs for those who are "better" but not good 
enough for advanced training, while helping the remainder 
to simply find employment more quickly. In the second tier, 
where the number of entrants and completers would be much 
smaller than in the first tier, substantial placement efforts 
would and could be exerted to assure employment in 
training-related jobs in order to assure that the intensive in 
vestments paid off.
Fourth, improved skills mean little if not recognized and 
utilized by employers. Recognition depends on identification 
of competencies acquired, documentation of the quality of 
the inputs which went into the preparatory experience, proof 
that standards were maintained, and recognition that the 
skills and competencies needed for specific jobs were, in 
fact, provided. If there are no "graduation" standards, if 
the certification is nothing more than a claim that some
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training occurred, if the quality of the training is suspect, or 
if the competencies taught bear little relation to what 
employers really want, the payoffs of training will be reduc 
ed, particularly over the longer-run when jobs will depend on 
acceptance of the credentials rather than the leverage of the 
CETA hiring subsidies and placement efforts.
Fifth, the future implications of these interpretations are 
even more significant. The size of the available workforce at 
any point in time, especially at the lower end of the 
employability distribution, is largely determined by the 
number of entrants and reentrants into the labor force. This 
number will decline dramatically relative to total employ 
ment as the post-war babies age into the prime working years 
and the participation rate of women levels off. The annual 
rate of growth of the civilian labor force age 20 to 24 is pro 
jected to fall from the 2.7 percent annual growth rate for 
males in the 1975-1979 period to -.1 percent annually be 
tween 1979 and 1985, then declining -2.9 percent annually in 
the 1985 to 1990 period. For all women, the rate of increase 
in the labor force will decline from 4.1 percent to 2.9 percent 
and then to 1.9 percent. Employment grew 2.7 percent an 
nually over the second half of the 1970s, and 2.1 percent over 
the entire decade. Anything close to this job growth would 
drastically exceed the 1.9 percent total labor force growth 
projected for 1979 to 1985 and the 1.3 percent rate for 1985 
to 1990.
The impacts will be greatest at the entry level. While there 
may be large numbers of relatively well-educated thirty-year- 
olds and women competing for mid-career advancement, the 
pressures at the career entry door will be reduced, as well as 
the competition for menial and casual jobs. Illegal or legal 
immigrants may fill the latter need, but they are unlikely to 
be allowed full access to the career-entry opportunities. The 
result is that many employers whose hiring policies are now 
structured to take advantage of the excess supply of entry ap-
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plicants will either lower their usual entry standards, 
regularize the career ladders so that the promise of a future 
can be used to attract entry workers, initiate their own inten 
sive preparatory programs, work more closely with public in 
stitutions, recruit from areas with excess workers, increase 
the pirating of trained employees and further protect their 
own workers by compensation provisions and advancement 
opportunities tying them to the firm. Past experience during 
the tight labor markets of the 1960s and current experience 
of industries and labor markets having trouble meeting man 
power needs, suggests that a combination of all these 
strategies will occur if labor market conditions change in the 
expected directions.
If more firms provide their own training and have to reach 
into the high-risk pool, they will be much more responsive to 
preparatory activities by public institutions that screen and 
provide some of the basic skills. More firms will be willing to 
specify their requirements and work with institutions to 
develop training programs targeted specifically to their 
needs. Since they will have to take more chances in hiring, 
they will be more receptive to a try-out approach which pro 
tects them from some of the risk. Persons who are trained 
and credentialed are more likely to find jobs at higher levels 
and have their credentials accepted even if they lack some of 
the other characteristics now expected in applicants for these 
better jobs. As more firms train, there will be an increased 
concern with other firms stealing their employees, and a 
desire to limit this if possible.
The degree of change depends on many things including 
immigration policies, military manpower needs, 
technological change, foreign competition, and national and 
world economic conditions. There is no crystal ball which 
can accurately project these developments. But all else being 
equal, the labor supply changes that can be projected with 
some certainty are massive. Employers will not alter their
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behavior overnight, and the degree of change will vary by in 
dustry, region and type of firm. But the market is enormous 
ly adaptable and the directions of change should work in 
favor of training which sorts and improves potential as well 
as more ambitious efforts to provide quantum leaps in 
documented skills. On the other hand, training that simply 
accesses low-level, menial jobs will be relatively less 
necessary or useful.
Management, Delivery and Decisionmaking
Local Variability
The local delivery system which accounts for nine-tenths 
of trainees and more than seven-tenths of training expen 
ditures under CETA is characterized by enormous diversity. 
There were 481 state and local jurisdictions designated as 
"prime sponsors" for CETA in fiscal 1980, that is, receiving 
funds by allocation, planning for the use of these funds, con 
tracting and managing activities, monitoring compliance, 
and reporting to the federal government. Under the "com 
prehensive" component of CETA (Title IIBC) which 
finances most local OJT and classroom training, prime spon 
sors have broad discretion to choose the types of participants 
and the types of services.
There is substantial variability in how they exercise this 
discretion—particularly in choosing between job creation 
and training—as well as in the results they achieve. The stan 
dard deviation measures the variation around the mean; 
there is a two in three chance that any point in a given data 
set will fall within a standard deviation on either side of the 
mean. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the stan 
dard deviation relative to the mean and is an indication of 
the relative dispersion of different data sets. A higher coeffi 
cient implies more relative variability in one data set than 
another. For almost all statistically measured dimensions of
126
prime sponsor decisionmaking and performance, the coeffi 
cients of variation are large.
Coefficient of
Standard Variation Among 
Average Deviation Prime Sponsors
Classroom trainees as share
Title IIBC participants 50% 22% 43% 
OJT participants as share
Title IIBC participants 11% 8% 74% 
Total trainees as share
Title IIBC participants 64% 21% 34% 
Classroom training cost
per participant $1328 $580 44% 
OJT cost per participant $1130 $697 42% 
Percent Title IIBC participants
entering employment 40% 14% 35% 
Cost per placement Title IIBC $6308 $4572 70%
The enormous variability in prime sponsors' emphases on 
training is not explained by the variability in economic con 
ditions or in the participants who are served. The two factors 
expected to have the greatest impact on local decisions would 
be the unemployment rate (which should affect the 
availability of OJT assignments, the jobs which could be 
secured through classroom training, and the relative attrac 
tions and need for job creation) and the youth share of Title 
IIBC participants (since youth are usually offered short-term 
subsidized jobs and are underrepresented in local classroom 
training and, even more so, in OJT). Regression analysis 
provides a way of determining how much one factor is af 
fected by changes in another variable when the remaining 
factors are held constant. It also provides a way of assessing 
the amount of the variance in the one factor which is explain 
ed by the variability in all the other factors within a data set. 
Regression equations which measure the relationship be 
tween the emphasis prime sponsors place on classroom train 
ing (as measured by the ratio of trainees to total fiscal 1980 
Title IIBC participants) and their unemployment rates and 
youth shares reveal that prime sponsors with significantly 
above average unemployment rates or significantly above
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average youth shares are slightly less likely to emphasize 
classroom training. But these two factors together explain 
little of the variability in classroom training emphasis. 
Neither do these variables have much relationship to, nor ex 
plain much of the variability in, classroom training expen 
ditures as a share of total expenditures, O JT participants as a 
portion of total participants, or combined OJT and 
classroom training enrollments as a share of total 
enrollments. To the degree a relationship exists, prime spon 
sors with higher unemployment rates tend to undertake more 
OJT and more total training (hence less work experience) 
than those with lower unemployment. By the same token, 
the unit costs of OJT and classroom training are only 
marginally related to unemployment rates or youth shares. 
Prime sponsors with high unemployment rates do not have 
to pay substantially more to access jobs for OJT, and the 
duration or intensity of classroom training which is related 
to the cost per participant, is not substantially greater in high 
unemployment areas nor substantially lower when more 
youth are served.
The factors which do seem to make a difference, even 
after regression controls for unemployment rates and youth 
shares, are the type of governmental unit making the deci 
sion, its size and regional location. Smaller prime sponsors 
with a labor force of less than 200,000 and state government 
sponsors are more likely to emphasize OJT under Title IIBC. 
Smaller primes (100,000 or less labor force) and the large 
cities (500,000 or more labor force) are more likely to em 
phasize classroom training, while states are less likely to use 
this approach. Expenditures for training as a portion of Title 
IIBC expenditures are lowest in the South and Northwest. 
The cost per participant in classroom training is highest in 
large cities, counties and consortia, reflecting cost-of-living 
differences probably as much as intensity differences. OJT 
costs are lowest for the smallest prime sponsors and for
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states. Prime sponsors which place a heavy emphasis on 
training under Title HBC also emphasize training under their 
structural public service employment and youth programs.
Differences in participant mix and in economic conditions 
are much more powerful in explaining the variability in out 
comes than the variability in training emphases and costs. 
Differences in participant mix—age distribution, race, sex, 
and welfare recipient shares—differences in area condi 
tions—unemployment rates, economic growth rates and quit 
rates—and differences in activities—on-the-job and 
classroom training shares, average lengths of stay and costs 
per enrollee—explained almost two-fifths of the variance in 
prime sponsor placement rates under Title IIBC in fiscal 
1980. Of these factors, the activities dimensions—training 
shares, lengths of stay and unit costs—had the least impact. 
For instance, more OJT contributed to higher placement 
rates but a standard deviation increase in the OJT share was 
associated with less than a fifth of a standard deviation in 
crease in the placement rate. In contrast, a standard devia 
tion increase in the unemployment rate was related to a stan 
dard deviation decrease in the placement rate. Yet the fact 
remains that the placement success of a prime sponsor is not 
foreordained by participant characteristics, economic condi 
tions or service patterns. Three-fifths of the variance in 
placement rates was not explained by detailed regression 
equations including a diversity of variables, suggesting that 
much may depend on the management of and emphasis on 
placement at the local level.
The Delivery Level Perspective
From the prime sponsor's perspective, the benefits of 
classroom training vs. work experience are not as apparent 
as the national impact studies would suggest. Prime sponsors 
do not undertake long-term follow-up, nor do they attempt 
to secure comparison groups in order to measure net im-
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pacts. They focus, instead, on short-term outcomes and the 
gains from entry to exit. Immediately at exit from CETA, 
the employment rates for 1976 work experience participants 
were higher than for classroom trainees (52 compared with 
29 percent). At the three-month follow-up, the differential 
was still in favor of work experience (52 to 46 percent). Even 
though the work experience group was more likely to be 
employed a month before entry, its gains from entry to exit 
were significantly greater than for classroom trainees, and 
from entry to three-month post-termination they were about 
the same. Work experience is also shorter and less costly per 
person year, so more people can be served by the work ap 
proach. At the same time, the public gets back a useful social 
product and locally-financed transfer payments may be 
reduced during the period of participation since wages offset 
welfare benefits while allowances do not. In other words, the 
benefit-cost calculus is different at the local level, and the 
emphasis on work experience is rational even if not socially 
optimal.
Likewise, the case for long-duration training is not as 
compelling from the local perspective. In the first quarter 
after termination, the percent of time employed for second 
half fiscal 1975 classroom trainees who stayed between half a 
year and a year was 46 percent, compared to 43 percent for 
those staying 30 to 90 days. The differential was 57 vs. 47 
percent over the entire post-termination year and 66 vs. 54 
percent in the second post-termination year. In other words, 
a 90-day follow-up would not show the greater relative gains 
made by the longer-term trainees. Based on prime sponsor 
placement rates for trainees of varying lengths of stay, and 
assuming costs proportional to length of stay, the cost per 
placement recorded by the prime sponsor for the 30 to 60 day 
training would be three-tenths that of training activities of 
over half a year's duration. With local pressure to serve more 
individuals, and Department of Labor pressure to reduce
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unit costs, it is not surprising that shorter training is em 
phasized.
Federal Rules and Oversight
The prime sponsors operate within the framework of 
federal regulations and federal oversight. The "feds" review 
the activity plans prepared each year by prime sponsors, but 
leave to local decisionmakers the choice among allowable ac 
tivities and among different subgroups in the eligible popula 
tion, as long as specified procedures are followed. The ex 
ception is the youth share requirement. The Youth Employ 
ment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 required that 
prime sponsors maintain youth service levels under Title 
IIBC at the pre-YEDPA level. Guidelines were introduced to 
enforce maintenance of effort, and these reduced the 
downtrend in youth shares which had been occurring each 
year since the implementation of CETA. The regression 
results suggest, however, that there is very little statistical 
relationship between prime sponsor youth shares and their 
overall emphasis on classroom or on-the-job training, and 
the impact results provide no reason why jobs should be 
preferred over training for youths. There is still significant 
local choice in the degree of emphasis on training.
The Department of Labor seeks to achieve year-to-year 
improvements in placement rates and unit costs in 
negotiating plans, but prime sponsors may justify exceptions 
in the plan or may seek modifications during the year. Ap 
parently, there is not too much pressure since the planned Ti 
tle IIBC placement rate approved for fiscal 1980, after the 
modification process had occurred, was below the level in 
fiscal 1979 and only 1 percentage point above the level in 
fiscal 1978. The variance in planned placement rates or the 
training shares is almost the same as the variance in actual 
placement rates and training shares.
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The stick necessary to give leverage to the annual plan ap 
proval and goals-formulation process is the performance 
review at the end of the year. After a top-to-bottom assess 
ment which considers goal attainment in the previous year, 
prime sponsors are rated as either eligible for immediate 
funding, as needing corrective actions over the next year, or 
as having serious problems that must be solved before fund 
ing. Unfortunately, the quality of training is given minimal 
weight in this assessment and no prime sponsor in 1980 
received a serious problem rating because of training. The 
only enforcement occurred when vocational education set- 
asides were grossly underspent or training requirements 
under IID not met, i.e., quantitative requirements establish 
ed in the law; but such issues involved only three of the 69 
prime sponsors rated overall as having significant problems. 
Process issues such as equal opportunity enforcement and 
monitoring procedures have been the major concern of end- 
of-year reviews and thus receive predominant attention by 
prime sponsors.
The federal regulations do not preclude long-term train 
ing. The regulations suggest that length of training should be 
determined according to guidelines provided in a Bureau of 
Labor Statistics publication detailing requirements for dif 
ferent jobs. This source suggests that six months is the 
minimum training period for almost any occupation in 
which classroom or on-the-job training occurs under CETA, 
and even in these cases there is a presupposition of basic 
competencies which are frequently lacking for CETA par 
ticipants and which would require extra time in addition to 
the vocational preparation. Since less than 1 percent of fiscal 
1976 classroom training entrants stayed in CETA for more 
than 450 days, the two-year limitation of training introduced 
in 1978 (which allows for six months further of unstipended 
training) cannot be considered an impediment to longer 
courses.
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The regulations do limit on-the-job training. In terms of 
costs, outcomes and public perceptions, OJT is desirable 
from a local perspective. While prime sponsors have varying 
success in securing employer cooperation, even the most suc 
cessful would probably like to do more. If a standard pro 
portion of IIBC participants in OJT were increased by a 
standard deviation, i.e., to a level now achieved by the best 
one-sixth of prime sponsors, there would still be less than a 
fifth of Title IIBC participants in OJT. The problem, then, is 
not so much the management of the component, but its 
design. Quite simply, the payments to the employers do not 
compensate for the risk in hiring someone of less certain 
qualifications and the paperwork involved. An experiment 
with alternative subsidy levels for the hiring of disadvantag- 
ed 16-19 year-old students has demonstrated that employers 
are responsive to higher subsidy levels, and that the response 
rate escalates when the participant is payrolled from CETA 
for a try-out period rather than hired first by the employer. 
The evidence strongly suggests that a redesign of the OJT 
regulations would be productive.
Federal Leverage Mechanisms
The federal measures which have most affected the level 
and duration of classroom training are the supplemental 
vocational education set-aside (6 percent of Title IIBC 
funds), the legislatively mandated training requirement 
under public service employment (which was 15 percent of 
Title IID PSE expenditures in fiscal 1980), and the HIRE 
and Skills Training Improvement Programs (STIP) which 
provided funds for on-the-job training and long-duration 
classroom training respectively, but only to those prime 
sponsors who could use the money and meet requirements. 
The increase in the vocational education set-aside from 5 to 6 
percent in the 1978 amendments, the operation of the STIP 
program (supported with discretionary funds) and the PSE
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training requirements, also implemented in 1978, accounted 
for all of the increase in local classroom training activity be 
tween fiscal 1978 and fiscal 1980. The Private Sector In 
itiatives Program which established local Private Industry 
Councils (PICs) and set aside funds for "private-sector" 
oriented activities has increased the share of funds going to 
training, simply because work experience is deemphasized in 
the funds allocated for PICs. The early results suggest that 
the PICs are not having an easier time marketing OJT than 
prime sponsors, and, hence, turn to classroom training and 
transition services. The expectations that business participa 
tion in decisionmaking and the intermediation of a business 
oriented group in the delivery process would make OJT more 
attractive, placement easier and employer cooperation much 
more likely were unquestionably exaggerated. PICs may do 
marginally better than prime sponsors, and the increment 
may be worth the cost, but more fundamental changes in 
policies and practices will be necessary to improve the effec 
tiveness of local programs in private sector placement.
Lessons from Job Corps
The Job Corps, operating under national direction and 
drawing participants from all areas of the country, offers 
several important lessons for the design and management of 
training activities:
First, intensive investments per individual are only likely 
when there is clear authorization and are only justified when 
the clients are extremely disadvantaged and are provided op 
portunities for significant gains. To achieve these ends, it is 
necessary to clearly specify both the service mix and the 
eligibility focus in the law and regulations, and to shift more 
responsibility to the national or perhaps state level rather 
than locally, where there are so many pressures to both dilute 
service intensity or to "cream" whenever significant oppor 
tunities are provided. The demography of Job Corps par-
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ticipants has changed hardly at all over the years and the 
legislative stipulation of services has thwarted the attempts 
by budget cutters and critics of intensive investments to trim 
the sinew and bone rather than the fat from the program.
Second, one of the most important factors behind the Job 
Corps' impact is mobility. The program draws individuals 
from areas of greatest need—usually where institutions are 
overburdened or nonexistent—and provides exposure to 
alternatives as well as a sense of independence. The number 
of intercity moves for job-related reasons is more than twice 
as high for Job Corps participants as for controls in the 18 
months after termination. Job Corps is the only CETA pro 
gram which is not localized. Most "national" programs 
funded under Title III of CETA provide extra service and 
delivery options which augment local activities but involve 
neither recruitment from multiple prime sponsors nor 
mobility of participants.
Third, three-fifths of Job Corps centers are operated on a 
contract basis by private corporations or nonprofit organiza 
tions. Competition provides options. Where a contractor 
performs poorly, another can be selected. In contrast, it is 
extremely difficult to suspend decisionmaking and manage 
ment authority of a local government unit. It is particularly 
difficult to fire the local bureaucracies directing the pro 
grams. And where the same government units are responsi 
ble for decisionmaking and management, they are likely to 
choose the approaches which are easiest or safest to manage, 
rather than what may be best for participants. Private sector 
management per se is not necessarily more effective—at least 
this has not been the case in Job Corps, where nonprofit and 
public managers of contract centers have done as well as 
private corporations—but the competition provided by the 
contract approach, the flexibility to hire and fire, the separa 
tion of program decisionmaking and program management, 
have all proved beneficial. By the same token, there are
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economies of scale and the potential for specialization of 
staff and standardization of management approaches which 
result where private or nonprofit contractors operate multi 
ple sites. Operation of the larger Job Corps centers is as com 
plex as management of local employment and training ac 
tivities (the annual budgets are larger for some Job Corps 
centers than for many prime sponsors), and the option is cer 
tainly one that should be utilized where local public sector 
management has been deficient.
Fourth, the Job Corps system provides a complete spec 
trum of opportunities ranging from special aid to the learn 
ing disabled all the way to college options for Corps 
members who advance rapidly, from vocational training in 
janitorial work for persons unable to perform any other jobs 
to multi-year training as computer customer engineers. If in 
dividuals cannot be served appropriately at one center, they 
can be moved to a component at another. Instruction is in 
dividualized and self-paced, while achievements are recorded 
and rewarded. The standardized educational programs are 
based around a diagnostic, prescriptive and progress 
measurement system. Most available public and private sec 
tor materials have been screened and cross-referenced to this 
system, so that there are a number of options to suit the in 
terests and needs of each individual. Likewise, training of 
ferings are based around competency-based achievement 
standards for each vocation, with a record of progress for 
each individual. Thus, enrollees are placed according to 
ability or interest, can advance as rapidly as possible, and 
can compete for advanced opportunities available within the 
system based on performance within the system. Financial 
and nonfinancial incentives based on measured ac 
complishments increase the effort of Corps members. This 
approach is in marked contrast to CETA which offers a 
"one-shot" treatment in most cases, with few incentives for 
performance, no record of achievement, and limited oppor 
tunities for "quantum leaps."
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Fifth, all activities in Job Corps operate under detailed na 
tional standards dictating minimum qualitative and quan 
titative inputs. On-site reviews can then assure that input 
standards are met. The use of a standardized competency 
assessment and progress systems for the vocational and 
educational components allows comparison across centers. 
Because there is the same essential mix of services from 
center to center, enrollee surveys can be and are used to iden 
tify potential problems in components. Most critically, with 
costs negotiated and itemized by detailed component, and 
with components relatively standardized, outcomes relative 
to national norms can be used to assess performance. 
Because the service mix and intensity of local CETA opera 
tions is so variable and because there are no qualitative stan 
dards, it is difficult to get the same torque on performance 
measurement systems. Not surprisingly, the coefficients of 
variation in Job Corps outcome measures from center to 
center are far smaller than those for prime sponsor opera 
tions. The poor performing center operators have few ex 
cuses, and hence low performers are subject to greater 
pressures and are more likely to improve over time.
Sixth, recruitment and placement are the weak links of 
nationally-directed programs such as Job Corps, and they re 
quire more attention. Job Corps recruits through its own 
system of contractors, usually state Job Services. Few prime 
sponsors use Job Corps as a treatment alternative on a 
regular basis. Some enrollees could be better served in local 
programs, while many participants in local CETA activities 
should be in Job Corps. Job Corps also has its own largely 
separate placement system that works in getting completers 
into jobs, but does not help dropouts and partial completers 
for the most part (in contrast to local classroom training 
where placement is more often provided to participants 
whatever their duration of stay). As a result, many Corps 
members have depressed earnings during the first month or
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so after termination even though they eventually break even 
or surpass like nonparticipants. This transition could be 
eased if local prime sponsors had the responsibility of plac 
ing individuals sent off to Job Corps for training and subse 
quently returning to the locality without a job, and if they 
were notified immediately or even before scheduled exit. In 
other words, local activities must be better linked with 
nationally-operated programs. They must begin to operate in 
tandem as a system rather than as isolated activities.
Improving Policy and Programs
Needed Directions of Change
The detailed analysis of all the facts and figures on train 
ing and its impacts reduced to some rather simple conclu 
sions: CETA (or its successor) should be putting more 
emphasis on training rather than work experience or job 
creation. On-the-job training, in particular, needs to be ex 
panded and the duration of institutional training should be 
extended. Placement efforts should go hand-in-hand with 
this training, with a focus on training-related placement, 
particularly when there are substantial training investments. 
Competency attainment should be emphasized and stan 
dards should be maintained for participants. Career oppor 
tunities should be available for those who prove themselves 
in the system.
The CETA system is not now designed or managed to 
achieve these ends. This is a statement of fact, not a critique. 
CETA's mission over the last decade has been, first and 
foremost, to create jobs, which was probably appropriate as 
the economy strained to absorb the exponentially increasing 
numbers of youth and female labor force participants. 
Evidence in support of new missions and approaches has not 
been available until recently. The decline in the number of 
labor force entrants which will provide the imperative for
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change are only beginning to occur. Yet if past patterns are 
justified, they also offer clues concerning the changes in 
policy and practice most likely to move the system along the 
paths which are, in light of new evidence and emerging labor 
market trends, now more appropriate.
Guidance for Local Decisions
Decentralization and decategorization were initiated under 
GET A in the belief that decisions about services, delivery 
agents and participants could best be made at the local level 
in response to local conditions. Diversity was both expected 
and desired. A planning system and procedural rules were 
formalized to assure a fair and reasoned set of decisions, 
placing primary reliance on an analysis of labor market con 
ditions as a guide to local decisions. It would be expected, 
then, that areas with similar economic conditions or similar 
target groups would tend to adopt similar choices among in 
tervention alternatives. Recognizing the crudeness of area 
data as well as participants, service mix and outcome 
measures, it is still surprising that the service patterns which 
vary so markedly bear little relation to either area unemploy 
ment rates—the primary consideration in planning and 
allocation—or to the proportion of youth served—the par 
ticipant mix variable expected to have the largest impact on 
the choice of local service strategy. The local factors which 
seem to affect decisions most are the structure of the deci- 
sionmaking unit and the historical patterns rather than the 
problems which are addressed. Certainly the findings 
eliminate many of the most common excuses of prime spon 
sors, i.e., that training does not occur because the "feds" 
force too many youth to be served or that below average 
OJT enrollments are necessitated by high unemployment, or 
that placement rates cannot be improved because of the par 
ticipant mix or area conditions.
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A basic issue is whether local decisionmakers know best 
what should be done in light of local conditions, and whether 
priority should be placed on adapting to these conditions 
rather than helping to move people where jobs and better 
training are available. A rational local decisionmaker con 
scientiously assessing placement rates, costs and three month 
follow-up results might rationally decide to emphasize work 
experience, or to put two people through 20-week training 
rather than offer one participant 40 weeks of training. From 
the local viewpoint, the effectiveness differentials do not 
square with those estimated by the "ivory tower" national 
impact studies. If the rational decision based on local 
evidence is also expedient—for instance, helping to meet 
public needs and reducing local payrolls through an em 
phasis on work experience rather than training—all the bet 
ter! If residents must be placed in local jobs and if these are 
scarce, the training options or payoffs may be limited so that 
job creation and short training for menial positions is most 
effective. It is not a condemnation of the quality of local 
decisionmakers to suggest that they may not know best in 
certain contexts because their perspectives are in some cases 
too limited, and the contexts may not be most appropriate 
for the individuals who are served.
Refocusing Federal Oversight
Because of the difficulty in pinning down activities, ser 
vices, or outcomes, much less the interrelationships between 
them, performance monitoring has been basically a ritual ex 
ercise. Where the diversity is so great because of local flex 
ibility and the lack of federal standards, it is difficult to 
second-guess any local decision or to judge local outcomes. 
Unlike Job Corps, where one center is very much like 
another, and the activities are defined by a set of detailed re 
quirements for each element, the descriptors for local ac 
tivities which are used in the federally-mandated manage-
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ment information system are not very specific and the con 
tent standards for activities are almost nonexistent. 
"Classroom training," even in a single prime sponsor, may 
range from a few hours of motivational and character 
development activities to full-time occupational training for 
a year or more. Outcome measures are not even tied to these 
broad categories nor are the individuals identified who par 
ticipate in any specific activity. The outcome measures are 
also so vague that they tell very little about performance; it is 
doubtful whether a "positive termination" really means 
anything and impossible to tell whether a "placement" is 
training related. Without the ability to measure what ac 
tivities are occurring, without standards about what should, 
as a minimum, go into each of these activities, and without 
outcome measures available by characteristic of participants 
and services received, it is impossible to make judgments 
about whether the activities are adequate or the outcomes 
appropriate. Hence, the federal oversight system focuses 
neither on inputs and their quality, nor on outputs and their 
meaningfulness, but rather on processes. Acceptable pro 
cesses do not guarantee and in fact may not even promote 
wise decisions or positive results. For instance, the summer 
programs operated by prime sponsors were acceptable until 
recently as long as plans were filed and the numbers of par 
ticipants counted. Yet inadequate worksite activities, poor 
supervision, and slack worksite standards were found in 
recurring assessments by the General Accounting Office. 
Beginning in 1978 the Department of Labor began to specify 
standards about what was required in worksites, provided 
models, demanded specification of activities in worksite 
agreements and used these agreements as an instrument in 
massively expanded on-site monitoring. There were substan 
tial improvements in the quality of worksite activities as a 
result of this emphasis on quality and on-site monitoring. 
These improvements were documented by the GAO but were 
no more visible in the management information collected by
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the Department of Labor than were the earlier shortcomings. 
In fact, unit costs rose noticeably as a result of increased 
management and monitoring efforts and more enrichment of 
worksite activities.
In a system which focuses on aggregates, and on quantity 
over quality, there is little incentive for the prime sponsor to 
develop high quality, intensive components. If these served 
only a small proportion of participants, their effectiveness 
would be completely hidden in a mass of numbers under the 
current management information system. Likewise, the 
"feds" could not easily assess intensive investment programs 
locally. Despite the massive paperwork requirements on 
local systems, the management information system does not 
collect the right information needed to support local or 
federal management, or to promote either long-term training 
or the progression of individuals in an orderly way through 
the system.
The "bogeyman" of the heavy-handed federal govern 
ment squelching local creativity and dictating decisions turns 
out to be a pussycat. There is no evidence that the federal 
regulations or the federal oversight restrict the amount or 
duration of classroom training undertaken by prime spon 
sors. The law clearly allows for two-year training courses, 
but local pressures result in the broadest distribution of 
limited resources. OJT is restricted because what is allowable 
is difficult to market, but federal oversight is certainly not 
the reason many prime sponsors do so little OJT. Yet if the 
federal presence is largely neutral concerning the exercise of 
local discretion over activity mix and design, the oversight is 
not benign. It focuses attention on ritual processes while pro 
viding no direction as to what is important. If the "feds" 
cannot or do not say what works or what the standards 
should be, nor do they review quality, neither can the local 
decisionmakers when dealing with politically connected local 
delivery agents. Why create new training institutions or ap-
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preaches when existing deliverers are clamoring for support 
and there are no incentives and few performance or impact 
standards for justifying alternatives? Why concentrate 
resources when low costs and services for more participants 
are favored by both local politicians and federal monitors? 
Why worry about relocation (which usually results in an out 
cry from some local residents and politicians) when planning 
is focused on local opportunities, and procedural re 
quirements are focused on choosing between local delivery 
agents? It takes all the ingenuity and resources available to 
the prime sponsor to avoid the process pitfalls that will be 
scrutinized in federal review, and to generate the plans and 
modifications that have little to do with operational realities.
If more and longer classroom training is needed as well as 
more OJT, past experience provides examples of how this 
can be accomplished—to a large extent simply by ar 
ticulating what is wanted in sufficient detail, utilizing perfor 
mance measures which can identify whether it is being ac 
complished, and providing funds specifically for the desired 
purposes. More classroom training can be accomplished by 
expanding the state set-aside or targeting local resources that 
can only be spent on training (i.e., the PSIP approach), by 
requirements for training under work experience as in PSE, 
or by an overlaid competitively-funded program such as 
STIP. Longer training can be accomplished by duration 
specifications for these earmarked and extra dollars, by em 
phasis from the federal level, and by the use of management 
information system descriptors that identify costs for 
specific types of services so that false economies are not 
achieved by simply shifting to less intensive activities within 
broad service descriptors. Marginally more OJT can be ac 
complished by guidelines, set-asides or competitive funding 
to areas able to move OJT dollars, but the real answer is to 
change the formula to provide for "try-out" employment 
before a hiring decision or training contract is signed with 
the employer.
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These actions would focus federal policy, but would not 
represent a reduction in local control, since there are already 
copious set-asides, categorical titles, minimum spending re 
quirements and the like. The key is to align these re 
quirements so that they achieve a coherent policy and pro 
vide clear guidance.
The real issue, then, is whether a consistent national policy 
can be developed and sustained. Currently the local CETA 
system tries to do everything it is told to do, and make the 
most rational decisions based on the evidence at hand, but 
the directions are not clear and the locus of decisionmaking 
inappropriate. The answer is not a new program model, or 
more vigorous performance monitoring, or redistribution of 
decisionmaking authority, although all these steps may be re 
quired. The need is rather to determine what we are trying to 
achieve, to set long-range goals, and to choose the next steps 
that will, with the least rupture to the present system, move it 
in these directions.
The dramatic decline in labor force entrants projected for 
the next two decades will create shortages of entry workers, 
increasing the importance and potential of training. The 
ends and means of the CETA system or its successor should 
be reoriented in light of future prospects and the evidence 
that long-term training pays off most. Training rather than 
job creation should receive priority. Where jobs are provid 
ed, they should be combined with and lead into training. 
Participants willing and able to make a "quantum leap" 
should be provided the opportunity. Placement must be em 
phasized, particularly for long-duration training. 
Mechanisms are needed to facilitate mobility from high 
unemployment and poverty areas.
Sagging productivity during the 1970s and the decline of 
our relative economic growth taught us the dangers of short- 
term perspectives, inadequate and erratic investments in
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capital and equipment, and wasteful use of scarce natural 
resources. The lessons are equally applicable to human 
resources. The future of the economy and the social fabric 
depends in great measure on our willingness to initiate and 
sustain policies which will develop of those who have tradi 
tionally been discarded and ignored, but who will be needed 
more in the coming decades.
At least on this one issue, the prescriptions to achieve equi 
ty and efficiency are coincident. Those who preach the 
supply-side Gospel, as well as those concerned with 
mitigating the inequalities which have proved resistant to 
short-duration interventions, should be able to find common 
ground in support of more intensive training investments for 
persons of limited employability.
